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STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Charles A. Reynard*
A total of nine cases involving issues of state and local taxa-
tion were decided by the court during the 1956-1957 term. Two
of these cases presented issues of only peripheral interest to the
field and do not seem to warrant discussion here.' Of the re-
maining seven cases, three were concerned with the substantive
aspects of specific taxes and the other four dealt with matters
of procedure. The cases will be discussed under the classifica-
tions just mentioned.
SUBSTANTIVE TAXATION
Two of the three cases in this classification presented issues
arising under the provisions of the sales tax.2 Fontenot v. S.E.W.
Oil Corporation3 was the more significant of these decisions in
terms of the issue presented as well as its effect upon potential
revenues of the state. The case grew out of an assessment of the
use tax, levied by the Collector of Revenue, upon an oil rig
brought into Louisiana by the taxpayer from Texas, computed
upon the basis of the original purchase price paid for the equip-
ment. The taxpayer, conceding that the use tax applied, con-
tended that it should be computed upon the depreciated value of
the equipment at the time it was introduced into the state. The
Collector relied upon the literal language of the taxing statute
which imposes the tax at the rate of two percent of the "cost
price" upon the use of all tangible property in the state (provided
no sales tax has been paid, here or elsewhere), and pointed to the
statutory definition of "cost price" set forth in R.S. 47:301 (3),
reading as follows:
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. In the case of In re The Board of Commissioners of St. Charles Parish
Hospital Service District, 232 La. 889, 95 So.2d 488 (1957), a suit by taxpayers
to restrain action authorized by a special election creating the district, it was
alleged that the election had been called and held in disregard of numerous re-
quirements applicable to such cases. The court found the numerous allegations
to be either without merit or unsupported by the facts.
Kotteman v. Grevemberg, 96 So.2d 601 (La. 1957) was a proceeding to re-
view the action of the Board of Tax Appeals revoking a permit to sell beer and
other beverages of a low alcoholic content. The court rejected the petitioner's
claims that "none of the actionable charges alleged against him was proved; that
the other charges alleged did not constitute grounds for revocation of his permit
and that the Board improperly permitted evidence to be introduced, over objection,
of violations which had not been alleged and of which no prior notice was given."
(96 So.2d at 602.)
2. LA. R.S. 47:301 et seq. (1950).
3. 232 La. 1011, 95 So.2d 638 (1957).
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"'Cost price' means the actual cost of the articles of tangible
personal property without any deductions therefrom on ac-
count of the cost of materials used, labor or service cost,
transportation charges or any other expenses whatsoever."
The Collector contended that these provisions, taken together,
were clear and unambiguous, affording no occasion for construc-
tion or resort to rules of interpretation to support the theory of
the taxpayer. It must be conceded that there is much support for
the Collector's thesis, as the language quoted above would seem
to exclude a credit for depreciation within the broad sweep of its
proscription against deductions of any "expenses whatsoever."
Nevertheless, the court found ambiguity in the term "cost
price," affirmed the action of the Board of Tax Appeals and the
district court and directed that the assessment be made upon the
basis of the depreciated value of the rig as of the date of its im-
portation in Louisiana. As a basis for its conclusion that the
language of the act was ambiguous and thus open to construc-
tion, the court said that a literal application of the language
"would tend to make the statute unjust, unreasonable, absurd
and contrary to the public interest - a result which clearly the
lawmakers did not intend."14 These consequences were said to
stem from the fact that (1) the use tax liability computed in ac-
cordance with the Collector's theory would place the taxpayer at
a competitive disadvantage with another producer who pur-
chased and imported a used rig of similar description at the same
time, or (2) "it is possible that the 'use' tax based on the original
cost of an article could exceed the actual value of that article at
the time of importation, in which event it would be practically
confiscatory." 5 Added support for the result was inferred from
the language of R.S. 47:303 which imposes the duty to collect the
sales tax upon "dealers" and says, inter alia, that "the use ... of
tangible personal property, shall be equivalent to a sale at retail,
and the tax shall thereupon immediately levy and be collected."
From this the court reasoned "that the 'use' tax is to be computed
on the retail price the property would have brought when im-
ported - that is, its then value or worth."6
It will be noted that the principal bases for the court's con-
clusion (competitive disadvantage and confiscation) are consid-
erations extrinsic from the statute itself. There is little to be
4. Id. at 1013, 95 So.2d at 640.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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found in the language of the act tending to create ambiguity.
The statutory formula for the imposition of the tax on "cost
price" -defined to prohibit deductions for "any . . expenses
whatsoever" -would seem to preclude any consideration of the
item of depreciation in calculating the' tax. The result may be
thought to be harsh, inequitable, unfair, or the consequence of
unsound tax policy, but it is extremely difficult to see how the
Legislature could have been more specific in directing the very
kind of assessment that the Collector sought to impose in this
case.
At the present time thirty states impose sales and use taxes.
Twenty-eight of these states measure their taxes by cost price
and the other two expressly provide that the measure of the use
tax shall be the value of the property put to use. The writer is
unaware of a decision in any other state, using the cost price
formula, holding that value at the time of importation shall be
the basis for computing the tax. It was once urged as a defense
in an Iowa case7 and was mentioned by the court in a Maryland
case.8 However, in both of these cases, as well as in a case from
New Mexico,9 the courts concluded that there was no tax liability
whatsoever, and the point was not decided. Courts reaching the
conclusion of no tax liability have stressed the compensating or
complementary character of the use tax (as a supplement to the
sales tax, designed primarily, if not exclusively, to protect the
local merchant against competition of neighboring states which
have no such taxes) and have concluded that unless the goods
were purchased with an intent to use them in the taxing state, no
liability for the tax attaches.
It will be recalled that the taxpayer in the instant case did
not contest liability for some amount of the tax, but disputed the
basis upon which it was to be computed. Under the circum-
stances, there was no occasion for the court to consider the fun-
damental question of the applicability of the tax. Perhaps the
taxpayer missed the opportunity to escape tax liability altogether
by failing to raise the point. Indeed, had the point been raised
and decided in the taxpayer's favor the writer would be less crit-
ical of the result. It is, at best, an open question whether the use
taxes are enacted with the intent that they be applied to the use
7. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 242 Iowa 33, 44
N.W.2d 449 (1950).
8. Tawes:v. Thompson Trailer Corp., 121 A.2d 850 (Md. App. 1956).
9. Rowan Drilling Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 60 N.M. 123, 288 P.2d 671(1955).
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of property brought into the state by contractors and others
whose businesses regularly carry them throughout the length and
breadth of the land. Courts squarely confronted with the ques-
tion have divided on the point; the cases resolving the issue
against taxability have already been cited 10 and decisions reach-
ing the opposite conclusion are legion."
The difficulty with the decision in the principal case is that
rather than resolving the fundamental question (as it was not
asked to do) the court reaches a middle ground which strikes
the writer as totally unwarranted by the legislative language.
This is not to say that the practical result is not reasonable. But
the reasonableness of tax policy should be determined by the
Legislature, not the courts. The facts of the case suggest the
impact which the decision will have upon tax revenues of the
state. Increasing numbers of large and expensive oil rigs are
being brought into Louisiana from Texas, which has no sales tax
(thereby depriving the owners of the right to a credit against
Louisiana use tax liability). The decision in the subject case
makes it clear that the Louisiana use tax in such cases will be
measured by the actual value at the time of importation, not the
original cost price, thereby substantially diminishing the amount
of use tax revenue available to the state. An additional, though
speculative factor, involves the extent to which this decision may
affect purchases of new equipment of this type from Louisiana
dealers.
The other sales tax case of the term was Trestman v. Col-
lector of Revenue,' 2 in which the taxpayer, a retail dealer in
ready-to-wear clothing, alleged that seventy-five percent of his
business consisted of sales of goods to seamen serving on ships
which docked at the Port of New Orleans and contended that all
such sales were either (1) exempt from the provisions of the tax
as wholesale sales or (2) beyond the constitutional power of
Louisiana to tax, being sales in interstate and foreign commerce.
The court rejected the taxpayer's contentions on both points.
The sales tax act makes no reference to "wholesale" sales, but in
effect exempts them by making its provisions applicable only to
sales "at retail," and excluding from the scope of the tax all sales
10. Notes 7, 8, and 9, supra.
11. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) ; Southern Pacific
Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939) ; Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Johnson, 13 Cal.2d
545, 90 P.2d 572 (1939) ; and Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal.2d
162, 119 P.2d 945 (1941) are typical.
12. 96 So.2d 713 (La. 1957).
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for resale. Section 301 (10) of Title 47 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes provides that "any dealer making a sale for resale,
which is not in strict compliance with the [Collector's] rules and
regulations, shall himself be liable for and pay the tax." There
was no showing that the taxpayer in this case had obtained re-
sale certificates required by the Collector's regulations from the
seamen to whom he made the sales and for lack of proof of such
compliance his bald characterization of such sales as "wholesale"
sales was dismissed.
On the constitutional point the court noted that the sale,
which is the subject of the tax, was completed and the goods de-
livered to the purchasers in New Orleans. Under the circum-
stances it is immaterial that the purchaser thereafter removes
the goods from the state in interstate or foreign commerce. Al-
though the latter point had apparently never previously been de-
cided by the court, a similar case had been resolved in the same
manner by the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans' s
(which the court cited), and the point is well settled in the fed-
eral jurisprudence. 14
The third and final case in this classification involved the
tobacco tax. If Louisiana's tax of eight cents per package on
cigarettes places a strong temptation upon smokers to buy their
cigarettes elsewhere and bring them home for smoking without
payment of the tax, the case of Fontenot v. Madigan'5 is a stern
warning that this is poor economy. The defendant in that case
had purchased twenty-five cartons of cigarettes outside the state
and consumed them without having affixed the eight cent stamp
to each package and paying the tax required. In summary pro-
ceedings for payment of the tax ($20.00) plus a penalty of
$500.00, interest and attorney's fees, he contended that he was
not liable for the tax as he was not engaged in the business of
buying and selling tobacco. Relying upon the provisions of R.S.
47:842(4) which define the term "dealer" to include "any per-
son who imports cigars, cigarettes or smoking tobacco from any
state or foreign country for distribution, sale, or consumption in
the State of Louisiana," the court rejected the defendant's claim
and affirmed the judgment for the tax, penalty, interest, and at-
torney's fees. Based upon the statutory language employed by
13. Fontenot v. Searcy & Pfaff, Ltd., 78 So.2d 204 (La. App. 1955).
14. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury of the State of
Indiana, 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
15. 96 So.2d 64 (La. 1957).
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the Legislature, the decision seems unquestionably correct. The
court also rejected a claim, well settled by a long line of cases,
that the tax was invalid because it was not levied according to
value, pointing out that it is an excise, not an ad valorem, tax.
TAX PROCEDURES
Four of the cases decided at the past term involved issues
relating to remedial steps available to taxpayers. Three of these
cases, each seeking to set aside tax sales of immovable property,
illustrate the absolute character of the peremption provision
embodied in the language of Article X, Section 11, of the Louisi-
ana Constitution of 1921, reading in part as follows:
"No sale of property for taxes shall be set aside for any cause
except on proof of payment of the taxes for which the prop-
erty was sold prior to the date of the sale, unless the proceed-
ing to annul is instituted within ... five years from the date
of the recordation of the tax deed .. .
In the case of Butler v. D'Antonio,1 a tax sale was declared
null and void where the heirs of the record owner of the property
which had been sold for non-payment of taxes showed that the
record owner had died, title having passed to them, and that no
notice of delinquency had been served upon them prior to the tax
sale. The provisions of R.S. 47:2180 plainly require such notice
to be served upon "the record owner of the property for which
the taxes are delinquent, or to the actual owner in the event the
record owner is deceased." Since the suit to set aside the sale had
been filed within the five-year period of peremption, this claim
was allowed to be established and the sale voided for noncompli-
ance with the legal requirements in such cases. On the other
hand, in the companion cases of Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jor-
dan 17 and Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Marks 8 where more than five
years had elapsed since the recordation of deeds to land sold at
tax sales, the court stated that "after the lapse of five years, as
here the case, a tax sale is immune from attack, except on proof
of prior payment of taxes, which proof has not been offered in
the instant case. The plea of constitutional peremption of five
years, urged by the appellees, is good and, therefore, sus-
tained."' 9 However, it should be noted that the court's statement
16. 231 La. 275, 91 So.2d 345 (1956).
17. 231 La. 594, 92 So.2d 377 (1956).
18. 231 La. 615, 92 So.2d 384 (1956).
19. Id. at 611, 92 So.2d at 383.
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on the point was dictum, as it had already determined that the
tax deeds in both cases were in fact valid.
The fourth and final case to involve taxpayers' remedies,
Willis v. Flournoy,20 posed an issue of construction and adminis-
tration of R.S. 47:1576, enacted in response to Article X, Section
18, of the State Constitution. The latter provision directs the
Legislature to forbid suits restraining the collection of taxes and
to provide remedies for the prompt recovery of taxes paid illegal-
ly. The statute sets forth the remedy, requiring taxpayers in
such situations to make prompt payment of their taxes under
protest and to institute suits for their recovery within thirty
days. The instant case involved the estate transfer tax levied by
R.S. 47:2431 and following, which provides that "whenever the
aggregate amount of all inheritance, succession, legacy and
estate taxes actually paid to the several states of the United
States . . . shall be less than eighty percentum (80%) of the
estate tax payable to the United States ... the difference...
shall be paid to the State of Louisiana." The taxpayer had made
an initial determination of tax liability under the above quoted
provision and had made payment of the tax thus computed to the
state. Thereafter, the federal government had audited the fed-
eral return and had substantially increased the amount of the
federal estate tax alleged to be due - based upon the claim that
certain property previously reported to be the separate property
of the surviving spouse was, in fact, a part of the decedent's
estate. Under these circumstances, additional sums were de-
manded of the taxpayer by the State Tax Collector pursuant to
the provisions of the estate transfer tax quoted above. The sum
demanded was paid under protest, and in keeping with the terms
of R.S. 47:1576, this suit was filed to recover most 2' of the sum
so paid on the theory that no such additional federal tax was
actually due. Stated differently, it was the taxpayer's contention
that the federal claim was founded upon a mistaken interpreta-
tion of state law. The trial court refused to decide the merits of
the case and simply entered an order staying further proceedings
in the case until there was a final decision of the issues by the
federal authorities. On review the court granted the taxpayer's
request and sent the case back to the district court with orders
to proceed to decide the issues, saying that R.S. 47:1576 was
20. 231 La. 264, 91 So.2d 33 (1956).
21. A part of the increase in the federal assessment was based upon an in-
creased valuation of other property which was not contested by the taxpayer.
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absolute, vested no discretion in the trial court to hold the matter
in abeyance, and that such a result was required by the constitu-
tional provision which directs the Legislature to provide "for a
complete and adequate remedy for the prompt recovery" of taxes
in such cases.
While the decision seems to be clearly supported by the con-
stitutional and statutory language involved, there would seem
to be considerable merit in the trial court's suggested disposition
of the case. While it is true, as the court indicated, that no fed-
eral judicial proceeding had in fact been instituted to resolve
the issue, and the taxpayer is under no duty to institute them, it
is nevertheless clearly foreseeable that interminable and confus-
ing litigation may well result from a premature decision of the
issues by the state courts before the federal issues are settled.
